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The traditional definition of government neutrality is quite
similar to the anti-discrimination principle. Under this theory,
which is sometimes called the anti-classification or color-
blindness principle, government must make decisions in an
impartial (or meritocratic) manner, and irrelevant
characteristics, such as race, cannot be a factor. Richard Posner
writes, “The proper constitutional principle is ... no use of racial
or ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of government
benefits and burdens.”6  Proponents of this jurisprudence claim
argue that it is the true intent of the 14th Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause – the prohibition that “no person” be denied
“equal protection of the laws” refers to all people, not just
members of minority racial groups.7
The one scholar of the Court to explore the possibility of
a jurisprudential connection between affirmative action and
the Revolution of 1937 is Cass Sunstein, who writes, “Many
of the constitutional arguments for and affirmative action thus
track the arguments for and against minimum wage
legislation.”8  Sunstein points out that in order for the Court to
determine whether a unique government benefit has been
granted or a unique burden imposed to one class over another,
it must employ a baseline standard. The most frequently used
baseline, such as in Lochner, is the status quo distribution of
rights, privileges, assets, resources, etc. Government inaction
allows the market – viewed as a natural and just arbiter of
benefits – to function legitimately; he labels this view status
quo neutrality. In fact, Sunstein contends that the term itself –
affirmative action – is based on notions of status quo neutrality,
because government is actively interfering in market-based
activities otherwise thought to be natural and just.9  Sunstein
contends that a new version of government neutrality emerges
in West Coast Hotel, a view that considers distributions of rights
and resources as a product of law and past (oftentimes unjust)
decisions; the Court’s new baseline in the case was the
guarantee of a basic standard of living.10
As an extension to Sunstein’s argument, this post-Lochner
conception of government neutrality is at the core of the anti-
caste principle. Also known as the equal citizenship or anti-
subordination principle, the anti-caste principle is perhaps most
clearly associated with the work of Kenneth Karst. He writes,
“the principle forbids the organized society to treat an individual
as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a
nonparticipant. The principle thus centers on those aspects of
equality that are most closely bound to the sense of self and
the sense of inclusion in a community.” Karst argues that
I. Introduction
Many constitutional scholars divide the Supreme Court’s
role in American democracy into concrete eras between which
the Court distinctly and fundamentally shifts its constitutional
outlook.1  While I wholeheartedly agree that the Rehnquist
Court approaches constitutional quandaries in a much different
manner than the Marshall Court, dividing the Court into isolated
categories is too uncompromising an approach. By treating
the Court throughout its history as simply the Marshall Court,
the Taney Court, the Lochner Era Court, the Warren Court,
etc., we miss the chance to explore jurisprudential similarities
that bind the different Courts together over time.2
This paper will confront two of the most controversial
issues the Court has faced in the 20th century: affirmative action
and economic rights articulated through the Revolution of 1937.
That year, in the case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,3  the
Supreme Court first sustained a minimum wage law,
representing the triumph of the New Deal over the infamous
Lochner Era. On its face, it seems that these controversies raise
distinctly different kinds of issues. Affirmative action deals
with civil rights and equal protection, while the minimum wage
involves questions about economic rights and due process/
freedom of contract. Yet if we look past the surface of the
substantive questions raised by these constitutional issues, we
can see that, on a jurisprudential level, a strong likeness between
the two debates exists.
This connection centers on the principle of government
neutrality, which, according to Howard Gillman’s definition,
holds, “[G]overnment power could not be used to gain special
privileges or to impose special burdens on competing groups.”
The state may only interfere with individual liberty to promote
a valid public purpose, such as public health, safety, and
morality. The neutrality principle is steeped in Jeffersonian and
Jacksonian traditions as a means of reducing the influence of
political factions that might take away individual rights,
especially to property.4  Government neutrality is best known
as the basis for the Supreme Court’s opposition to progressive
economic legislation during the Lochner Era. For example,
the Court in Lochner v. New York (1905)5  reasoned that a
maximum workweek law for bakers constituted a special
benefit to workers at the expense of bakery owners. Since the
Court found that law was not designed to promote a valid public
purpose – such as protecting the health of the bakers – the law
was struck down on government neutrality grounds.
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“formal equality” alone, by which he means the absence of
racial classifications in law, is not satisfactory to ensure social
justice and inclusion. Instead, government must proactively
ensure that all citizens have the tools needed to pursue their
conception of the good life.11
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the
jurisprudential parallels between the debate over the minimum
wage during the Lochner and New Deal Eras and the current
debate over affirmative action. Specifically, this paper will
demonstrate that opponents of progressive economic
legislation, using the status quo conception of government
neutrality, and opponents of affirmative action, using the anti-
discrimination principle, are essentially making the same
theoretical argument in different substantive contexts. Similarly,
this paper will illustrate the congruities between the anti-caste
principle as a defense of affirmative action and the conception
of government neutrality developed in West Cost Hotel. This
connection is one that has largely been ignored legal theory
literature, and it deserves a much more thorough consideration.
II. Government Neutrality and Anti-Discrimina-
tion Principle
A. Government Neutrality and Economic Lib-
erty Through the Lochner Era
The doctrine of government neutrality is as old as the
Constitution itself. The Supreme Court first articulated the
principle in the 1798 case Calder v. Bull. The Court ruled that
a legislative change to probate court regulations did not amount
to an ex post facto law, but it also stated the limits of
governmental power: “[A] law that takes property from A. and
gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers.”12  As mentioned
above, the neutrality principle was the judicial manifestation
of the philosophies of Madison, Jefferson, and Jackson. In
Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned against “the
violence of factions,” by which he means “a number of
citizens…united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.”13  What both Madison and the Calder Court are
saying is that allowing competing groups in society to use
political power to redistribute resources and benefits turns
government into an agent promoting favoritism rather than the
public interest. The requirement that government actions serve
public rather than private interests was first articulated in
Aristotle’s theory of politics, which was certainly influential
to the Founding Fathers. For example, Aristotle wrote, “It is
evident, then, that those regimes which look to the common
advantage are correct regimes…while those which look only
to the advantage of the rulers are errant.”14
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson’s conception of the good life
centered on the virtuous yeoman farmer. To help foster that
American ideal, Jefferson believed that government largely
should not interfere with the workings of the economy.
Jefferson wrote, “We remark with special satisfaction those
[favorable circumstances] which, under the smiles of
Providence, result from the skill, industry and order of our
citizens managing their own affairs in their own way and for
their own use…”15  Jefferson’s view of the market reflected
his optimistic view of society – they are both naturally
harmonious. Therefore, capable and ambitious workers and
farmers should be able to achieve success on their own because
of the relative equality in bargaining power of the actors in the
economy. Jefferson also presupposed that the availability of
land on the frontier would be an escape mechanism for
Americans who occasionally fell victim to a malfunctioning
market.16
Jefferson also viewed the potential source of socio-
economic tension between “republicans” and “anti-
republicans.” The “republicans” consisted of yeoman farmers
and laborers who aligned politically with Jefferson. On the
other hand, “anti-republicans” were merchants and bankers who
supported Alexander Hamilton. While the former outnumbered
the latter, the “anti-republicans” possessed the power to threaten
the interests of the rest of society. Jefferson viewed Hamilton’s
economic plan as impermissibly partisan as it utilized
government power to give advantage to an elite minority.17
Government neutrality to Jefferson was a logical weapon to
protect the interests of the less powerful majority.
Andrew Jackson perhaps offered the most resolute defense
of government neutrality as a means of providing equal
opportunity. In his veto of legislation extending the Second
Bank of the United States, Jackson stated, “[W]hen the laws
undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial
distinctions…to make the rich richer and the potent more
powerful, the humble members of society…have a right to
complain of the injustice of their Government.”18  Two
important arguments stand out from this message. First,
Jackson’s conception of government neutrality is that it protects
vulnerable classes from abuse by the politically powerful.19
Second, Jackson viewed the status quo distribution of resources
and benefits to be “natural and just.” These two different beliefs
set up a potential contradiction that lies at the heart of this
paper – how can government neutrality protect the interests of
the disadvantaged if any change to the status quo is an unjust
disruption of a natural ordering of resources?
At the turn of the 19th century, the Court faced that very
contradiction as state governments enacted progressive
economic legislation to combat the social injustices of
industrialization. For example, the State of New York passed a
maximum workweek law for bakery workers. The challenge
to that law resulted in the 1905 Supreme Court decision Lochner
v. New York.20  Attorneys for Joseph Lochner, a bakery owner,
contended that the New York law did not serve a legitimate
public purpose. Instead, the measure was “purely a labor law,”21
meaning a law seeking to use government power to grant special
benefits to a single class. Other critics of New York’s position
reasoned that the true intent of the law was to benefit rival
bakeries, whose unionized workers already worked less than
ten hours a day. Forcing all bakeries to abide by a maximum
workweek law would eliminate the advantage enjoyed by non-
unionized bakeries.22
Intriguingly, the first line of reasoning in Lochner’s brief
addressed equal protection, not freedom of contract. Lochner’s
attorneys argued that the New York law exempted certain
classes of bakers – such as restaurant bakers and ordinary
housewives – from its provisions.23  Even the freedom of
contract arguments in the brief for Lochner have strong
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overtones of equal protection claims. Lochner’s attorneys
included a lengthy Brandeis-like24  appendix with statistical
evidence demonstrating that baking was not an unhealthy
occupation.25  Thus, according to Lochner, the New York law
exceeded the reach of the police power, on the first hand,
because it did not serve a public purpose. Second, the law
singled out bakers for special treatment while not imposing
similar restrictions on more dangerous professions.26
In the end, Lochner’s arguments prevailed, as the Court
ruled five to four to strike down the labor law. Justice Rufus
Peckham, the author of the majority opinion, utilized
government neutrality claims in his reasoning, but he employed
a more extreme form of the neutrality principle. A layperson,
reading the opinion in Lochner without prior knowledge of
the case, would likely assume that a bakery worker, not an
owner, brought the challenge to the workweek law. For
example, Justice Peckham noted that many bakers might desire
to earn extra money through working longer hours, an
opportunity denied to them under the labor statute.27  Notice
the way that the Court posed the question of the case: “Is this
[measure]…an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate…?”28
It would have been easier for the Court to draw on the line
of argument advocated by Joseph Lochner in his briefs. The
Court did declare that baking was not a dangerous livelihood
compared to other occupations not subject to state regulation.
At this point, the Court could have ruled that arbitrary regulation
of bakeries violated the neutrality principle by advantaging
workers at the expense of employers. This would make sense,
given that it was a bakery owner challenging the law. However,
the Court instead chose to put the liberty of bakery workers at
the center of the debate.
Underlying the paradigm that the Court chose in Lochner
is a crucial assumption. As we shall see below, opponents of
affirmative action offer a similar assessment of minorities.
Justice Peckham writes:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not
equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other
trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able
to assert their rights and care for themselves without
the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their
independence of judgment and of action.29
If the Court is correct that limiting the length of the workweek
abridged the liberty of workers, it must be because workers
already possess that liberty to choose terms of employment.
This is a controversial assumption at best, given the massive
socioeconomic changes occurring at the time. Did poor bakery
workers in 1905 have the bargaining power to negotiate
favorable terms of employment? Lochner’s opponents certainly
did not believe so, and I will address that point of view in the
next section.
Government neutrality developed out of socioeconomic
conditions that existed at the time of the nation’s founding, a
stark contrast from the beginning of the 20th century. Whether
the Court recognized that the American economy had changed
such that this assumption was no longer valid is unclear,
although legal progressives certainly were only beginning to
advance that case.30  Given the Court’s relative political
independence from the other branches of government and its
relative isolation from prevailing notions of public opinion, it
is conceivable that the Fuller Court did not fully appreciate
the socioeconomic landscape of the year 1905.
The outgrowth of the assumption of equal bargaining
power between economic classes is a reliance on status quo
neutrality. Assume that workers are in a position such that they
do not need special benefits from government. Under this
situation, if government does grant those benefits, it is violating
the neutrality principle. To view whether government is acting
neutrally or not depends on the baseline standard of comparison.
According to Cass Sunstein, “[The Lochner] Court took as
natural and inviolate a system that was legally constructed and
took the status quo as the foundation from which to measure
neutrality.”31  In the sphere of economic rights, using the status
quo as the baseline seems logical if one views previous market
outcomes as just. This faith in the legitimacy of the free market
is not simply a view invented by uncaring conservative judges
on the Supreme Court, as some critics have contended.32  Rather,
faith in the free market was a belief passed down from the
Founding Fathers, especially Jefferson.33
B. Government Neutrality as the Foundation of
the Anti-Discrimination Principle
Although the Lochner Era conception of government
neutrality and the anti-discrimination principle are applied in
fundamentally different areas of constitutional law, the inner
logic of both principles are entirely congruous. Redistribution
of economic resources was considered partisanship because it
altered a status quo that was assumed to be just. Likewise, the
anti-discrimination principle prohibits discrimination on racial
grounds, regardless of the intent or the target of the
classification. This doctrine evolved after Brown v. Board of
Education (1954)34  and some of the subsequent desegregation
cases and rests on the premise that the destruction of legal
barriers was the necessary (and only permissible) condition
for promoting equal opportunity. Just as the adherents to
government neutrality in the Lochner Era had faith that the
market would produce just outcomes without state interference,
the believers of the anti-discrimination principle have a similar
faith in desegregation. We can see evidence of this line of
reasoning in the Court’s jurisprudence on affirmative action as
well as legal commentary on the issue. For the sake of brevity,
I will limit the discussion of affirmative action to race-based
remedies.
One of the early affirmative action cases to reach the
Supreme Court, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
(1978),35  involved a challenge to a quota system employed by
the University of California at Davis. The admissions policy
reserved 16 of 100 places in each year’s class to certain minority
races. The Court, in a fairly convoluted decision, ruled that a
quota system violated the 14th Amendment Equal Protection
Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However,
the Court left the door open to admissions policies that used
race as one of many factors to promote a diverse educational
environment, justified on free speech grounds. Invoking
“educational diversity” as a form of academic freedom
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protected by the 1st Amendment seems a bizarre way to decide
a question that more plainly fits under the umbrella of equal
protection. Since educational diversity cannot be applied to
other race-based affirmative action programs, such as
workplace remedies, the Court’s position on affirmative action
remained somewhat ambiguous for another decade.
Justice Lewis Powell, writing the opinion of the Court,
construed the Equal Protection Clause in a manner consistent
with the anti-discrimination principle. He declared, “The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to
a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same
protection, then it is not equal.”36  Powell built his contention
from previous racial discrimination cases. In its brief,37  UC
Davis had argued that the Court should only concern itself with
discrimination targeted at racial minorities, as declared in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938).38  Powell, citing
Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942),39  responded that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits any “invidious” classification,
regardless of who is targeted.40  Second, Powell noted that in
the case McDonald v. Santa Fe (1976),41  the Court ruled that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected whites against
discrimination.42  Finally, Powell applied the principle
articulated in Loving v. Virginia (1967) that racial distinctions
are “odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.”43
Eleven years after Bakke, the Court expanded on this anti-
discrimination logic in Richmond v. Croson (1989), a challenge
to a Richmond city government plan to increase the number of
contracts issued to minority-owned businesses.44  In that case
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Court’s majority,
stated that all racial classifications inherently pose a risk of
stigmatic harm, thus all classifications must meet the standard
of strict scrutiny. Consequently, the Court ruled that affirmative
action programs in the workplace should be reserved for
remedying specific instances of previous racial
discrimination.45  Justice O’Connor also reiterated the principle
articulated in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)46  that the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are “personal rights,”
not group rights.47
In Shelley, the Court held that racially restrictive housing
covenants are not judicially enforceable because they violate
the Equal Protection Clause in the context of a personal right
to property. Even though Shelley took place after the Revolution
of 1937, I have argued previously that the case relies strongly
on Lochner Era conceptions of property rights.48  Justice
O’Connor’s citation of this case is an indirect appeal to the
traditional conception of the neutrality principle defended
strongly during the Lochner Era. There is more than a little
irony for Justice O’Connor to invoke Shelley and Justice Powell
to cite Loving in Bakke. Both Shelley and Loving were victories
for African Americans, but the legal logic of both decisions
left the door open to protecting the civil rights of whites as
well. Ironically, while the Court has often criticized the notion
of group rights through the Equal Protection Clause as a means
to achieve racial justice, the academic diversity rationale
reaffirmed in Grutter can be seen as a group right. I do not
mean that the academic diversity is a proxy for a quota, but
rather that it grants universities power to be greater than the
sum of its parts. Admissions offices have the power, though
narrowly tailored, to recruit a student body which will best
contribute to the marketplace of ideas. The Court’s preference
towards “personal” rights would seem to imply a preference
towards admissions decisions being strictly meritocratic
rewards for academic potential.
The Court clarified its stance on affirmative action in
higher education in the recent University of Michigan cases,
Gratz v. Bollinger49  and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).50  In Gratz,
the Court struck down an undergraduate admissions policy that
automatically awarded bonus points to minority applicants. In
Grutter, however, the Court sustained a law school admissions
policy that used race as a factor through a more individualized
review of applications. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who
authored the Court’s opinion in Gratz, rearticulated two basic
suppositions in accordance with the anti-discrimination
principle. First, he cited Adarand Constructors v. Pena
(1995),51  when the Court held that any person, regardless of
race had the right to challenge a discriminatory government
action. Second, Rehnquist expanded on the Bakke logic – the
admissions policy did not sufficiently meet the standards for
meritocracy required by the anti-discrimination principle.
Automatically awarding bonus points, he reasoned, granted
preference based on race, rather than an individualized ability
for a student to contribute to educational diversity.52
In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Clarence Thomas put even
more emphasis on the anti-discrimination principle. He began
by quoting Frederick Douglass, who said: “What I ask for the
negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply
justice. The American people have always been anxious to
know what they shall do with us… I have had but one answer
from the beginning. Do nothing with us!”53  This attitude of
picking oneself up by one’s bootstraps corresponds strongly
to Justice Peckham’s observation in Lochner that bakers are
intelligent enough to bargain for employment terms.54  Thomas
also declared that supposedly benign classifications are
offensive “because every time the government places citizens
on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”55  Justice Thomas goes
as far as to say that the Court’s majority sows the seed for the
rebirth of racial segregation.56
Even before the Court issued its opinion in Bakke, legal
scholars began to develop the anti-discrimination principle. In
1975, Alexander Bickel wrote, “[W]e are told that [affirmative
action] is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter
of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was
demanded are to be more equal than others.” Affirmative action,
according to Bickel, is similar to segregation because it
perpetuates racial divisions. Bickel criticized affirmative action
programs based on quotas because they constitute zero-sum
games. For every person who benefits from a quota, someone
else becomes a victim of the system. Similarly, the Lochner
Era Court viewed the progressive economic legislation as
taking benefits that belonged to one person and giving them to
another. Instead, Bickel implored using positive-sum game
affirmative action programs, such as increased minority
recruiting and training.57  These strategies would create equality
of opportunity without partisanship.
Justice Antonin Scalia, before ascending to the Bench,
labeled affirmative action “the disease as cure.”58  Among his
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various criticisms, Scalia pointed out the arbitrariness of
selecting groups to benefit from affirmative action. Many white
subgroups, such as Italians, Jews, and the Irish, were victims
of past discrimination, yet are now being called upon to make
sacrifices to other minority groups. He wrote, “I owe no man
anything, nor he me, because of the blood that flows in our
veins.” Furthermore, he claimed affirmative action often does
not accomplish its purpose, which he calls “restorative justice,”
because many African American students who benefit from
the program are already well educated and not in need of
government help.59  Scalia also contended that affirmative
action would create a public perception of black students as
undeserving. It seems obvious that Scalia was attempting to
build off Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896), when he argued that segregation caused
blacks to be viewed as an “inferior class of beings.”60
Finally, economist Thomas Sowell advocated for the anti-
discrimination principle by challenging the economic
presuppositions of support for affirmative action programs.
Sowell declared, “Group discrimination…can be inferred from
differences in group ‘representation’ only insofar as the relevant
characteristics…do not differ substantially from one group to
another. This is not even approximately true.”61  For example,
Sowell observed that the median age of African Americans
and Hispanics (in 1980) was much below the national average.
Statistics showing minorities earning smaller incomes are
therefore skewed because most minorities have not been
working as long. Sowell noted that income differences among
different age groups were much higher than those based on
race.62  The government’s definition of affirmative action
beneficiaries is also unfair, according to Sowell, because it
includes groups that earn average incomes both above and
below the national average.63  Underlying this argument is the
notion that if government is going to grant certain groups
special treatment, government must be able to empirically
justify its decision. In the absence of a true need for special
assistance, such preferential treatment is constitutionally
illegitimate. This line of argument may explain the growing
support for socio-economic affirmative action as a replacement
for race-based affirmative action.
III. Government Neutrality and the Anti-Caste
Principle
A. The New Deal Conception of Government
Neutrality
The debate over the Lochner decision seems like a clash
between a libertarian faith in individualism and free markets
against paternalistic state interference. One would think that
the philosophy of John Stuart Mill would be the foundation of
the Court’s decision in Lochner. For example, Mill wrote, “With
respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary
man or woman has the means of knowledge immeasurably
surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.”64  In
other words, Mill had faith in the rationality of the individual
to be the best judge of his or her welfare. For society to use
coercion to compel individuals to go against what they view
as in their welfare is to insult and destroy individual autonomy.
Applied to Lochner, if bakers are willing to work long hours
in a bakery, the government should not stop them.
However, Mill’s argument assumes that individuals
possess the power to act upon the judgments of their feelings
and circumstances.65  The law at issue in Lochner should fall
under a category of legislation Mills described as “required
not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their
own interest, but to give effect to that judgment.” This principle
allows government intervention because the citizens were
“unable to give effect to it except by concert, which concert
again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction
from the law.”66  In other words, individuals ought to be free to
pursue their interests and welfare, but in some cases, strong
obstacles stand in their way of actualizing their interests. In
these cases, individuals are justified in appealing to
governmental coercion because the force of law is stronger
than their individual ability to pursue their goals. Thus, certain
laws may seem paternalistic, but in truth they may really be
the only way for individuals to set the conditions necessary for
the exercise of their autonomy. To use a concrete example:
there is a moral difference between a collective bargaining
agreement between labor and management and purely
monopolistic coercion.
One of the first legal scholars to adopt a position similar
to this with regard to industrialization was Seymour Thompson.
In an address in 1892, Thompson decried the growing power
of corporations. Particularly, Thompson feared that the goal of
corporations was to take care of its stockholders rather than its
workers. The bifurcation of management and labor that began
to occur in the Industrial Revolution changed the bargaining
power between management and labor because of this new
business focus. He wrote that since a corporation had only legal
obligations, it therefore “destroys all sense of moral
responsibility on the part of the managers.”67  Additionally, he
argued technological innovations altered the labor market such
that workers became expendable.68  Consequently, corporations
have both the ability and the willingness to exploit their relative
bargaining power when making employment contracts with
workers. Thompson observed, “What mockery to talk about
the freedom of contract where only one of the contracting
parties is free!”69
In his famous critique of the Lochner decision, Learned
Hand also stressed the need for equality of bargaining power
as a precondition for the traditional interpretation of
government neutrality. He cited Knoxville Iron Co. v.
Harbison,70  a 1901 case in which the Supreme Court upheld a
Tennessee law that required companies to pay workers in cash
instead of scrip or coupons. Of that wage law, the Court said,
“Its tendency, though slight it may be, is to place the employer
and employe [sic] upon equal ground in the matter of wages,
and, so far as calculated to accomplish that end, it deserves
commendation.”71  Judge Hand then asked why the work-hours
law in Lochner would not be sustained under a similar
justification. Hand concluded:
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal
the relative strategic advantages of the two parties to
the contract, one of whom is under the pressure of
absolute want, while the other is not, is as proper a
legislative function as it should neutralize the relative
advantages arising from…superior physical force.72
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Historian William Willoughby proposed a new social ideal
building off that of Mill, which he called “modern liberalism.”
Willoughby predicated the theory on the notion that “[f]reedom
means a real liberty to chose.”73  Recognizing the massive
socioeconomic changes occurring at the time, Willoughby
characterized the plight of many workers as economic slavery.
He took issue with the traditional interpretation of government
neutrality, that non-interference in the market best protects
individual freedom of contract. “On the contrary,” Willoughby
wrote, “it may mean the sanctioning by law of conditions which
will in effect destroy any real freedom.”74
In a statement similar to that of Mill, Willoughby
contended, “Our philosophy…holds that liberty and law are
correlative terms: that the first can truly exist only through,
and by virtue of, the second.” Without government intervention,
economic forces would only perpetuate the unjust
socioeconomic landscape.75  Perhaps the most intriguing part
of Willoughby’s argument is that he rejects the idea his
philosophy is a form of socialism. On the contrary, modern
liberalism would give individuals only the opportunity by
which to actualize their conception of the good life. Willoughby
labels this argument “affirmative action,”76  possibly making
him the first person to use the term. The goal of modern
liberalism is “the equalizing of opportunities,”77  making it a
very different approach to achieving the traditional goals of
government neutrality. Franklin Delano Roosevelt used the
term “affirmative action” to describe the New Deal. He said,
“The word ‘Deal’ implied that the Government itself was going
to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objectives
rather than stand by and hope that general economic laws would
attain them.”78
Eventually, the Court abandoned Lochner in favor of a
New Deal conception of economic rights in the so-called
Revolution of 1937. In the case West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937),79  the Court upheld a minimum wage law for women.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for the majority,
began his opinion by noting “the economic conditions which
have supervened”80  that demanded a review of the Court’s past
rejection of minimum wage legislation in Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital.81  In that 1923 case, the Court struck down a minimum
wage statute on Lochnerian grounds. The updated economic
conditions of the country largely served as the basis for Hughes’
argument; he refers to inequality in bargaining power between
workers and employers on seven occasions.82
Hughes did not believe that the Court needed to discard
government neutrality in order to sustain a minimum wage
law. He did not focus on the liberty of contract aspect of
neutrality, but on the deeper objective of promoting equal
opportunity and the public interest. Government neutrality,
according to this view, is designed to prevent arbitrary exercises
of state power to the detriment of the public good.83  Hughes
wrote, “The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to
reduce…the exploit[ation] of workers at wages so low as to be
insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their
very helplessness the occasion of a most injurious
competition.”84  In light of the mistreatment of workers, Hughes
concluded, “Legislative response to that conviction cannot be
regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have to
decide.”85
Cass Sunstein argued that the fundamental change that
took place between Lochner and West Coast Hotel is a shift in
baselines to which government neutrality is applied. In the
traditional conception of government neutrality, the status quo
distribution of assets was the appropriate baseline largely
because it was assumed the free market produced just
outcomes.86  Sunstein writes, “Status quo neutrality disregards
the fact that existing rights…are in an important sense a product
of law.”87  Thus, if the status quo is the product of unjust past
decision, status quo neutrality is indefensible.88  The Court’s
recognition of unjust economic practices forced it to question
the continued usage of status quo neutrality.
In Lochner (and Adkins), the Court viewed progressive
economic legislation as robbing an employer to give to workers.
By 1937, the Court viewed the actions of unjust corporations
as stealing from the public interest for their own profit. The
Court’s new conception of equality viewed workers as entitled
to a decent standard of living, a right that was often denied.
Sunstein writes, “The Court’s claim is that the failure to impose
a minimum wage is not nonintervention at all but simply
another form of action – a decision to rely on traditional market
mechanisms, within the common law framework, as the basis
for regulation.”89  In other words, perpetuating an unjust status
quo through inaction was itself constitutionally equivalent to
direct partisan government action creating an unjust situation.
B. Government Neutrality as the Foundation of
the Anti-Caste Principle
As with the anti-discrimination principle, we can see the
influence of government neutrality on the development of the
anti-caste principle. The New Deal conception of the neutrality
principle permitted government interference to promote
economic opportunity in light of huge inequalities in bargaining
power. The anti-caste principle holds the same logic with regard
to racial groups. We can witness these similarities in both case
law and scholarly literature.
In their dissents in Bakke, Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall both contended that affirmative action is
the latest development in the struggle to affirm the Founding
Father’s promise of equality in spite of the past history with
slavery.90  After enduring centuries of constitutional
subjugation, Justice Marshall proclaimed, “[W]hen a State acts
to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot
believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier.”91  Just
as progressive legal scholars employed social science evidence
to bolster their case for economic legislation,92  Justice Marshall
cited statistics demonstrating the extent to which the lack of
educational opportunities impacted African Americans.93
Justice Brennan observed, “[T]he conclusion is inescapable
that applicants to medical school must be few indeed who
endured the effects of de jure segregation…or the equally
debilitating pervasive private discrimination…, and yet come
to the starting line with an education equal to whites.”94
As a result of social, economic, and political position of
African Americans, Justice Brennan implored, “[W]e
cannot…let color blindness become myopia which masks the
reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated within our
lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow
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citizens.”95  On the contrary, Justice Brennan outlined a number
of Court precedents to demonstrate that race-conscious
remedies should be the means to end the effects of segregation.
He cited North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann (1971),96
where the Court ruled that colorblind remedies to school
segregation would “render illusory the promise of Brown.”97
Justice Brennan, relying on Green v. County School Board
(1968),98  declared that a public body that once discriminated
“cannot bring itself into compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause simply by ending its unlawful acts and adopting a neutral
stance.”99  Furthermore, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education (1971),100  the Court ruled race-conscious
school assignment plans permissible as a means of remedying
a history of segregation. But even in the absence of past
discrimination, such plans were allowable to creating racial
pluralism within student bodies.101
Justice Brennan construed the Equal Protection Clause as
prohibiting only stigmatic classifications, not all racial
classifications (even some invidious racial classifications are
sanctioned, as in the case of Korematsu v. United States,
1944).102  Invoking Brown, Justice Brennan noted that Allan
Bakke’s rejection from UC-Davis in no way approached the
level of harm felt by black children due to segregation. Instead,
affirmative action is the price that must be paid to compensate
African Americans for “educational disadvantages which it was
reasonable to conclude were a product of state-fostered
discrimination.”103  Justice Marshall also cited United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey (1977),104  in which the Court upheld a
redistricting plan that increased the voting power of racial
minorities at the expense of a Jewish majority.105  Such a plan
is certainly inline with the New Deal commitment to equality
of opportunity, whereas the Court in Lochner rejected such a
zero-sum game solution as partisan.
Justice Marshall wrote a similarly strong dissent in
Croson106  In accordance with the New Deal conception of
government neutrality, Marshall argues that current economic
conditions of African Americans in Richmond is due in large
part to the legacy of discrimination. While the city was almost
majority black, only .67% of public construction contracts were
being granted to minority-owned businesses at the time.
Marshall concludes, “To the extent this enormous disparity did
not itself demonstrate that discrimination had occurred, the
descriptive testimony of Richmond’s elected and appointed
leaders drew the necessary link between the pitifully small
presence of minorities in construction contracting and past
exclusionary practices.”107  Nonetheless, Marshall’s argument
did not meet the standard set by the Court’s majority of
remedying specific instances of past discrimination.
Turning to the scholarly community, Cass Sunstein argues
that a post-New Deal conception of government neutrality
provides constitutional legitimacy to affirmative action.
Sunstein argues that, similar to economic disparities at
beginning of the 20th century, disparities in opportunities
between blacks and whites are often unjust products of legal
decisions. Under these conditions government action, like in
West Coast Hotel, is not illegitimate favoritism, but rather a
commitment to the principle of neutrality. And like Justice
Marshall and Learned Hand, Sunstein believes, “Efforts to
eliminate the second-class citizenship of blacks should hardly
be regarded in the same way as efforts to perpetuate it.”108
Kenneth Karst believes that the anti-caste principle (which
he labels the equal citizenship principle) flows logically from
the country’s historical struggle with equality. According to
this view, the true legacy of Jacksonianism is an aversion to
the unjust accumulation of special privileges by the powerful,
and it implies an affirmative duty to remedy the effects of
segregation.109  The Court in Brown reaffirmed this “old
tradition”110  by making black school children full members of
the community. Karst zeroed in on Chief Justice Warren’s claim
that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community.”111  Although Brown dealt with
educational segregation, Karst believes the Court extended this
principle in several per curiam decisions striking down
segregation in other areas of public life.112
Furthermore, Karst attempted to debunk the anti-
discrimination principle: “If we allow major substantive
inequalities to persist…equality of opportunity will serve
mainly as a comfort to the comfortable, a slogan assuring them
that they have earned their favored positions.”113  As a result of
these inequalities, public perception of African Americans as
inferior will only continue. The individualized system of justice
embodied in the anti-discrimination principle ignores the fact
that individuals often suffer harms because of their group
membership.114  In the area of affirmative action, the anti-
discrimination principle makes no sense because all
classifications be they merit, experience, race, gender, etc.
divide people into groups. When a white student challenges an
affirmative action policy, he is not claiming to suffer
discrimination as an individual, but as a member of a disfavored
group.115  Thus, Karst claimed, courts should weigh the harms
suffered by white students against the perpetuation of stigmatic
harms to blacks.
Owen Fiss likewise took aim at the anti-discrimination
principle to illustrate its deficiencies. He wrote, “The
antidiscrimination principle is not compelled or even suggested
by the language of the [Equal Protection] Clause.”116  Although
a colorblind conception of justice may sound appealing, Fiss
called it “the strangest and cruelest ironies” that the Equal
Protection Clause would view preferential and exclusionary
classifications in a similar manner.117  As a result of the
discriminatory intent standard mandated by the anti-
discrimination principle, government can offer innocent
justifications for its actions that disguise their true motive,118  a
critique distinctly similar to Justice Harlan’s in Plessy.119  The
search for objective classifications, according to Fiss obscures
the true purpose of the Equal Protection Clause: “[W]hat is
ultimately at issue is the welfare of certain disadvantaged
groups, not just the use of a criterion…”120
In order to promote social welfare, Fiss proposed a version
of the anti-caste principle, which he calls the group-
disadvantaging principle.121  Fiss argued that the focus on
arbitrary discrimination misses the point because it “is the
species, not the genus”122  of a deeper conception of racial
injustice. A system of group rights is well founded because
racial groups (but not artificial classes, such as the poor)123
have distinct existences apart from the individual members,
and those members are also interdependent. Fiss emphasized
that this logic explains why the Dred Scott Court declared that
freed blacks were not really free.124  Since African Americans
lack national political power to advocate for their interests,
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Fiss believes that the judiciary has the duty to protect their
rights,125  reasoning that sounds much like Mill’s. Nonetheless,
Fiss did endorse limits to the group-disadvantaging principle.
For example, levying sales taxes and ensuring minimum
qualifications for employees and students are permissible, even
though both policies may disadvantage many African
Americans.126
IV. Conclusion
Part of the reason why the debate over affirmative action
remains unresolved is that both the anti-discrimination principle
and the anti-caste principle offer compelling normative
justifications. Advocates of both positions argue that they are
the true heir to two of the most important opinions in Supreme
Court history: Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy and the Court’s
opinion in Brown. On the one hand, Justice Harlan observed,
“In view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here.”127  Yet in the very next sentence he
writes, “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.”128  Similarly, Chief Justice
Earl Warren’s wrote that the 14th Amendment was intended “to
remove all legal distinctions”129  between the races. But he also
based his decision on the notion that segregation “generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect [black children’s] hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.”130
The controversy over affirmative action is analogous to
the Court’s earlier struggle with economic rights because of
the legal principles involved. Both struggles involve attempts
to balance hard work and skill against deeper notions of fairness
as ingredients for prosperity. Do changing social conditions
require a reexamination of traditional government neutrality?
If so, how far can government reach before it crosses the line
into impermissible favoritism? In a larger sense, the debate on
affirmative action is a modern incarnation of an age-old debate
on American civic virtues.131  The anti-discrimination principle
is a strongly deontological argument that invokes the Puritan
work ethic and the notion of pulling yourself up by your
bootstraps. The anti-caste notion of providing a baseline from
which groups can compete fairly is a more teleological
argument with ties to the principle of equality of opportunity.
I do not attempt to provide a legal theory to answer these
American dilemmas; instead I wanted to frame the debate in
such a way as to promote a greater understanding of these
important constitutional issues. When constitutional historians
study a particular era of the Court, far too often they describe
a jurisprudence that is the unique product of the Justices sitting
on a particular Court. Since each historical period of the Court
is sui genesis, constitutional theory becomes less relevant
because the actors shaping that theory come and go over time.
While the period approach to constitutional history explains
many aspects of constitutional change, a strong understanding
of public law should also emphasize constitutional ideals that
transcend the changes in historical realities.
An emerging perspective in political science argues that the
policy preferences of individual justices play a larger role in Court
decisions than legal factors such as precedent.132  The behavioralist
approach may be right, but it is important to understand that
constitutional principles are not merely products of politics and
policy preferences. They are deeper expressions of civic ideals.
Government neutrality jurisprudence, throughout time and in
different substantive contexts, beautifully encapsulates American
conceptions of the good life, which makes our public law a worthy
scholarly endeavor.
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